Understanding socio-demographic disparities in the labor market: the case for a motivation-based theory by Baguelin, Olivier
Understanding socio-demographic disparities in the
labor market : the case for a motivation-based theory
Olivier Baguelin
To cite this version:
Olivier Baguelin. Understanding socio-demographic disparities in the labor market : the case
for a motivation-based theory. Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques 2005.64 - ISSN
: 1624-0340. 2005. <halshs-00196132>
HAL Id: halshs-00196132
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00196132
Submitted on 12 Dec 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/Publicat.htm
ISSN : 1624-0340
Equipe Universitaire de Recherche
en Economie Quantitative - UMR 8594
       
Understanding socio-demographic disparities




Understanding socio-demographic disparities in the
labor market: the case for a motivation-based theory
Olivier Baguelin∗
EUREQua, Université Paris 1
September 19, 2005
Abstract
This paper puts the empirical case for a motivation-based theory of socio-
demographic disparities in the labor market. We Þrst present the basic knowl-
edge as regards earnings disparities in the labor market and sum up the classic
assessment of the theoretical literature focusing on pure pay discrimination. We
then make an attempt to demonstrate that the relevant issues as regards socio-
demographic disparities in the labor market, are rather hiring discrimination and,
above all, occupational segregation. In this spirit, we have provided in an early work
a motivation-based theory of hiring discrimination suggesting a particular pattern
of socio-demographic occupational segregation. We check what our model suggests
both against statistical and micro evidence. We end with a discussion of the links
between our approach and dominant existing theories.
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Various aspects of socio-demographic disparities in the labor market have often been
treated in isolation from each others in theoretical analyses.1 Although empirical studies
analysing together these various features2 displayed conclusive evidence,3 most theoret-
ical literature kept emphasizing on wage discrimination. Cain puts the case for such a
predilection:
(...) when discrimination takes the form of widespread refusals to hire
or promote minority workers, this should lower their relative wages. The
minorities must bid for jobs in less favored Þrms, industries, occupations, and
so on. (...) my point here is that wage outcomes will reßect this reduced
demand for the minority group. Cain (1986, p. 700)
Yet, this was not to say that giving an account of some socio-demographic gaps in
average earnings is enough to understand the very realities feeding them.
Our point here is that theorists should care about the detailed (micro-)realities of socio-
demographic disparities in the labor market. Understanding them is not just a matter of
reproducing earnings gaps, it requires models that are consistent with the broadest set of
evidence regarding these disparities.
In this perspective, we have provided in a previous paper4 a theory of hiring discrimi-
nation based on the propensity of agents to develop intrinsic motivation in the workplace.
Intrinsic motivation resulted from the decision to achieve self-esteem through work that is,
in the terms of our model, from the holding of a workplace identity.5 We have argued that
agents from distinct socio-demographic groups could diﬀer in their propensity to hold the
workplace identity which led to diverging opportunities in the labor market. Our focus
was on gender and black/white diﬀerences.
The present work is both a discussion of the literature about socio-demographic dis-
parities in the labor market and an assessment of a motivation-based theory. It comprises
three parts. The Þrst aims at displaying the classic assessment as regards theories em-
1Notable exceptions are the segmented labour market theories of Bergman (1971) and Arrow (1973).
2Most notably, by putting the stress on the relationships between phenomena such as occupational
segregation and socio-demographic gaps in average earnings.
3For a survey, see Gunderson (1989).
4See Baguelin (2004).
5As opposed to an out-of-the-workplace identity.
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phasizing on earnings disparities. We stress the fact that, at the micro level, the case
for wage discrimination is not that staggering (the pure wage discrimination story looks
questionable at least). We then turn to available evidence about hiring discrimination
and occupational segregation. We believe these are relevant issues both at the micro and
macro levels. In this perspective, we explore the link between occupational segregation
and socio-démographic gaps in average earnings: this channel is showed to be particularly
adequate. The third part is devoted to our motivation-based theory of hiring discrimi-
nation. After a short informal exposure of the main features of our theory, we apply it
to interprete the evidence about hiring discrimination gathered all through the Þrst two
parts. We then display the consequences of this theory in terms of occupational segrega-
tion. To the extent that the occupational segregation our theory is leading to is bound to
be vertical, it provides ground for an explanation of socio-démographic gaps in average
earnings.
1 Earnings disparities in the labor market
What do we know about the general proÞle of socio-demographic earnings disparities in
the labor market? What are the main theories available?
1.1 Statistical knowledge and micro doubts
The more documented cases as regards socio-demographic disparities are gender and
black/white diﬀerences.
1.1.1 Empirical findings
Data for 2001 show that, across OECD countries, women still earn, on average, 16% less
than men per hour worked.6 Gender diﬀerences in observable characteristics that inßuence
productivity, such as education, potential experience and job tenure, account for little of
this gender gap in wages. For the United States, Þndings indicate that in 1980 and 1990,
black men were earning, on average, 12 to 15% less than white men (controlling for...).7
6OECD Employment outlook (2002).
7See Darity & Mason [1998].
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1.1.2 What micro reality hides behind the figures?
A Þrst hypothesis is that socio-demographic gaps in average earnings respond to dif-
ferences in human capital investment. Assuming that women expect to spend a lower
part of their adult lives at work than men, their return to human capital is lower which
involves lower investments, and lower earnings. As for ethnic minorities, diﬀerences in
family background or home and neighborhood environment would lead them to have less
human capital on average. In fact, such stories suggest that earnings inequalities only
reßects pre-labor market disparities. Johnson and Neal (1996) provide a statistical test
of this hypothesis. Wondering how much of the racial minorities/whites earnings gap (for
the United States) is explained by diﬀerences in skills that are formed prior to market
entry, they show that an adequate proxy for pre-market skills, the AFQT (Armed Forced
Qualifying Test), appears as explaining a large part of racial earnings gaps for currently
employed workers.
Human capital theory does not that good as regards the gender gap. For the United
States, Blau and Kahn (1997) show that almost 30% of the gap was due to wage diﬀerences
between men and women with similar measurable human capital. What is more, in OECD
countries, women often do better than men as regards education achievement. Another
story has been put forward: that of the "family gap". In some countries, mothers earn
considerably less than their childless peers when account is taken of the fact that they
work fewer hours. This is the case for United States where evidence of a negative eﬀect
of children on womens wages has been obtained, even in analyses which control for labor
market experience.8 However, Þndings in the OECD employment outlook (2002) suggest
that, except for a few countries, there is little evidence of an hourly wage penalty attached
to motherhood.
Besides, an interesting point is that fatherhood seems to induce higher merit increases
compared to male worker with no family responsabilities.9 Why do mothers suﬀer such a
"familiy gap" but not fathers?
As for the human capital explanation of the racial pay gap, Johnson and Neal (1996)
do not exclude that expected discrimination in the labor market to be responsible for the
8See Waldfogel (1998).
9See, Gunderson (1989, p. 52), or more recently, the OECD employment outlook (2002).
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poor average performance of black children.10 Though, the question of socio-demographic
diﬀerences in average earnings has raised a central hypothesis: that of pay discrimination.
1.2 Micro theories of discrimination in the labor market and
the socio-demographic gap in average pay
If one can generate wage discrimination, one is bound to directly explain statistical wage
socio-demographic disparities in the labor market.
1.2.1 Statistical discrimination
The idea is that employers cannot observe everything they wish to know about job appli-
cants. If they believe - rightly according to Johnson and Neal (1996) - that mean expected
productivity (human capital) is statistically lower for blacks (resp. women) than for whites
(resp. men)11 then it is rational from them to use race (resp. gender) as a signal of lower
productivity (or higher turnover propensity) and to oﬀer a lower pay to women and non-
white workers. A self-fulÞlling prophecy mechanism is often added, that assumes that the
lower opportunities oﬀered to minorities might be harmful as regards their incentives to
invest in human capital. This statistical-based behavior of the employers would then lead
to the pre-market disparities in human capital mentioned above.
1.2.2 Taste-based theories: the assumption of a prejudiced labor demand
Maybe the most intuitive explanation for wage discrimination against black people or
women is the existence of some prejudiced agents on the labor demands side. The exercice
is then to clarify how these prejudices determine observed socio-demographic gaps in
average earnings. Altonji and Blank (1999) present a survey of the papers that merge ideas
from search models of the labor market with Becker-style12 models of taste discrimination.
These models improve the standard analysis to a threefold extent. First, costly search
10See also Heckman (1998, p. 107).
11Another assumption in statistical discrimination stream, is that signals of productivity are less precise
when uttered by members of the minority group (but that expected productivity is the same across socio-
demographic groups). This option has proved to receive less empirical support.
12Becker (1957, 1971).
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implies that the whole distribution of prejudicial tastes matters;13 second, it implies that
agents suﬀering from prejudices are at a disadvantage (as regards pay) even when their
numbers are small relative to that of non-discriminating labor Þrms; third, costly search
entails that discrimination is unlikely to be eliminated by the entry of new Þrms.
1.2.3 The classic objection: gaps in average pay are long lasting
Evidence suggests that socio-demographic gaps are long lasting.
Since Becker (1971), a central question posed to taste-based theories of discrimination
is how the wage gap might sustain itself in a competitive environment14: it might be
suspected that those theories are unable to generate lasting wage discrimination. Do the
analyses surveyed by Altonji and Blank (1999) allow to remove these suspicions? An
indication of the relevance of this concern is that in analyses of employer discrimination,
prejudiced employers keep earning lower proÞts than unprejudiced ones.
Several assumptions deÞne the long-run. Among them: that of perfect labor mobility,
that of free entry, that of perfect capital mobility. The point of the papers surveyed by
Altonji and Blank (1999) is that costly search involves that, even in the long run, labor
mobility is imperfect. As regards free entry, it is argued that because of entrepreneurial
talent scarcity (even in the long run), prejudiced employers may survive. But the third
point remains: capital goes where proÞts are! Since proÞt diﬀerential favors unprejudiced
employers, prejudiced ones will be driven out of the market.
As regards the statistical discrimination mechanism justifying socio-demographic pay
gap, Darity and Mason (1998) note that, in the long run, employers are likely to Þnd
methods of predicting the future performance of potential employees with suﬃcient accu-
racy that there is no need to use additional signal of race or gender. This is all the more
plausible that, both minority workers and employers have incentives to improve hiring
tests.15 The discussion is then not closed.
13Not simply the degree of prejudice of the marginal employer of the less favored socio-demographic
group.
14As Arrow (1998) points it: "If the members of two races, after adjusting for observable diﬀerences in
human capital and the like, received diﬀerent wages [...], an arbitrage possibility would be created which
be wiped out by competition."
15As Cain (1986) stresses, if the worker knows his or her own ability, a low-cost private exchange
method minimizing this impediment is to oﬀer a trial period of employment to demonstrate their true
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Although micro evidence of pure pay discrimination is lacking,16,17 this hypothesis
was a direct way to give an account of statistical diﬀerences between socio-demographic
groups. But its compatibility with the long run pressures of markets economy raises
doubts. Yet, there is no need of pure wage discrimination to obtain statistical disparities
in earnings. Pure wage discrimination certainly exists, but some evidence suggests that it
is unlikely to explain the entire observed gaps, nor to be the central micro reality hiding
behind them.18
2 Hiring discrimination and occupational segregation
in the labor market
Major aspects of disparities between social groups in the labor market are hiring discrim-
ination and occupational segregation. The distribution of employment by occupation or
sector is still very much gender-segmented.19 Similar evidence exists that involves racial
diﬀerences.20 Furthermore, consistent micro evidence is available about hiring discrim-
ination which endows analysts with precise indications as for the routes through which
productivity. As regards gender discrimination linked to diﬀerences in work probabilities, Cain shows
that it should not generate gap in average earnings.
16As François notes
In contemporary labor markets, discrimination rarely takes the form of women being
paid less than men in the same jobs at the same establishments (...) François (1998, p. 4)
Among the scarce sources of micro evidence of pay discrimination, the analysis of court cases - see
Darity and Mason (1998).
17See also Gunderson for which:
(...) pay diﬀerences for the same narrowly deÞned occupation within the same estab-
lishment do not account for much of the (male-female earnings) gap. Gunderson (1989, p.
51)
18See François (1998), Blau & Kahn (2000) or the OECD Employment Outlook (2002) for the gender
gap. For the racial gap, see the discussion in Holzer (1998).
19SeeTreiman and Hartman (1981, p. 33), Johnson and Solon (1986) and an extensive discussion and
survey in Gunderson (1989).
20See Gittelman and Howell (1995).
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socio-demographic diﬀerentials are realized. Thus, reported facts strongly suggest an
indirect way to explain socio-demographic disparities in earning.
2.1 Both a documented micro reality and a statistical fact
We successively tackle the evidence on hiring discrimination and occupational segregation.
Hiring discrimination occurs when two individuals with similar productive characteristics
do not have an equal chance of getting a job.
2.1.1 Direct evidence of hiring discrimination
Audit studies21 conÞrm that hiring discrimination is widespread: for a large class of jobs,
with similar resumés (regarding productivity-relevant characteristics), both women and
blacks experience a lower chance to be hired than white men. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003) conduct a global study of racial discrimination in hiring. Manipulating the per-
ception of race (in otherwise similar resumés) by using distinctively ethnic names, they
show that "callback" rates are signiÞcantly lower for distinctively black-named applicants.
Neumark (1996) studies sex discrimination in restaurant hiring. He Þnds that in high-
price restaurants (where waitpersons earnings are higher), job applications from women
had an estimated probability of receiving a job oﬀer signiÞcantly lower than those from
men. Other Þndings indicate that hiring discrimination depends on the type of jobs under
consideration.22
The two latter studies bring rich and detailed insights as regards hiring discrimination
and resulting occupational distribution of socio-demographic groups.23 In the remaining,
we will refer to them when discussing the adequacy of various models to micro evidence.
21For some elements as regards the principle and methodology of audit studies see Riach and Rich
(2002).
22See Petit (2003).
23Although catering industry may look a bit particular (as well as the occupation of waitperson), we
view Neumarks Þndings as very informative as one looks at discrimination and segregation in some
details.
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2.1.2 Occupational segregation: both horizontal and vertical
Occupational segregation is said to be horizontal when it involves a segregated distribution
of socio-demographic groups between jobs that correspond to a given standard of earnings.
It is said to be vertical when jobs under consideration diﬀer with respect to earnings
standards.
Further statistical evidence about occupational segregation According to
Gunderson (1989), diﬀerences in the occupational distribution of males and females ac-
count for a substantial portion of the overall earnings gap.24
Descriptive statistics. Let us start with some evidence gathered in the OECD em-
ployment outlook for 2001 about gender diﬀerences in occupation. Women are over-
represented in clerical occupations, sales jobs and the life-science/health and teaching
professions, whereas they remain under-represented in managerial and top administrative
occupations, as well as in manual and production jobs. The large majority of both women
and men are concentrated in a small number of occupations that tend to be either female-
or male-dominated. For the United States, the following table displays the occupational
distribution of black and white workers (of each gender) by job category as well as mean
hourly earnings for each job category.
24See Treiman and Hartman (1981, p. 33).
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Oﬃcials and managers 6.0%* 4.4% 9.4% 16.4% $31.16
Professionals 6.3% 10.2% 21.0% 17.5% $27.18
Technicians 4.6% 5.8% 6.3% 6.6% $19.89
Sales workers 9.6% 13.2% 14.8% 11.0% $14.50
Oﬃce and clerical workers 7.6% 25.6% 24.1% 5.0% $13.41
Craft workers 9.4% 1.9% 2.1% 13.6% $18.20
Operatives 23.1% 9.6% 6.2% 16.0% $12.94
Laborers 14.9% 6.7% 4.2% 7.0% $10.98
Service workers 18.5% 22.7% 11.9% 6.9% $10.32
Sources: The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2002 EE0-1 and Aggregate Report and National Compensation Survey, 20
Available online: http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/2002/us.html and www.bls.gov/ncs/home.html.
* Reading: 6% of black male workers belong to the class Oﬃcials and managers.
This table oﬀers a clear view on dissimilarities in the distribution of the diﬀerent socio-
demographic groups between industries. Furthermore, a look at mean hourly earnings for
each job category, brings a Þrst enlightenment as regards vertical occupational segregation:
the black/white diﬀerence in distribution is particularly striking in top earning standards.
Empirical analysis. Some studies actually document the link between occupational
distribution and the racial gap in average earnings. Cunningham and Zalokar (1992)
analyze the determinants of black women economic progress for the period 1940-1980.
Curbing the explanatory impact of human capital theories, they Þnd little evidence that
convergence in the characteristics of black and white women (increasing similar education,
for example) is responsible for black womens increased relative wage and occupational
status and conclude that black womens improved economic status after 1940 was largely
due to decreases in racial discrimination by occupation and industry. Gittleman and
Howell (1995) study the eﬀects by race and gender of changes in the structure and quality
of jobs in the United States between 1973 and 1990. The relative concentration of blacks
in low quality (and poorly-paid) jobs is clear.
25As regards the content of each job category below, see the webpage
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/glossary.html.
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Yet, neither these studies nor the above Þgures can be interpreted as micro evidence
of vertical segregation (each category contains too many diﬀerent jobs). What can we
learn from micro studies?
Micro evidence of vertical occupational segregation. As regards the wider ques-
tion of disparities in the labor market, a crucial contribution of Neumark (1996) is to
document, through a micro empirical study, evidence of vertical occupational segregation
by gender.26 In a single industry (catering), he distinguishes two statuses: waitperson in
high-price restaurants, waitperson in low price restaurants. The interesting thing is that
vertical occupational segregation arises, with a majority of men working in high-price
restaurants (which pay well), and a majority of women working in low-price restaurants
(which pay poorly). Neumark mentions studies which conduct a comparable test for
racial discrimination: it turns out that discrimination against blacks exists in high-price
restaurants.27 Studying racial discrimination in the United States urban labor market
between 1910 and 1950, Sundstrom (1994) emphasizes the role of norms against white
subservience to blacks played in determining the racial composition of occupations.
This empirical documentation of hiring discrimination and vertical occupational seg-
regation makes an indirect analysis of statistical wage disparities looking particularly
promising. The idea is that the most signiÞcant channel to explain average earnings dis-
parities lies in vertical occupational segregation rather than in pure wage discrimination.
As François puts it
(discrimination) is manifest in men having better access to higher paying
jobs within an occupation type, even when traditional labor market charac-
teristics are controlled for. François (1998, p. 4).
This position seems consistent with the long lasting nature of earnings disparities:
26Neumark (1996) provides the following useful clariÞcation as regards the various forms the link
between occupational segregation and wage disparities can take. Existing gaps in wage can be broken
into across occupation components and within-occupation components. The gap that remains within
occupations may reßect pure pay discrimination between employees of diﬀerent socio-demographic groups
working alongside one another. It may also reßect segregation across high- and low-wage Þrms, or
segregation across jobs within occupations and perhaps also within Þrms.
27but to a lower extent than for women.
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as Cunningham and Zalokar (1992) suggest, vertical occupational segregation is not a
recent trend, nor hiring discrimination - see, for the United States, the examples of racial
preference in help wanted advertisements published in some 60s newspapers gathered by
Darity and Mason (1998).
2.2 Available explanations of occupational segregation
Occupational segregation can arise for many reasons, involving or not hiring discrimina-
tion.
2.2.1 Explanations involving hiring discrimination
The Þndings above suggest that hiring discrimination may be involved in occupational
segregation: it might result frommore severe employer discrimination in some occupations
than in others.
We can come again to taste-based theories of discrimination at this stage. Indeed,
even though they are not very well suited to predict lasting gaps in average earnings, they
support sustainable lasting segregation - blacks (women) being absent from industries for
which labor demand is prejudiced. Yet, there is no obvious way to explain the distrib-
ution of prejudice among industries. The customer discrimination perspective suggests
that labor demand should be more discriminatory for sales occupations: the table above
does not carry unequivocal support to such a prediction. Assuming a situation where
unprejudiced employers are numerous enough to hire all black (female) workers,28 the
employer discrimination perspective does not make any particular prediction as for the
industries that are more likely to exhibit segregated work force. Thereby, those theories
can predict horizontal occupational segregation but hardly where it should arise.29 The
story involving prejudiced co-workers30 is of particular interest as regards vertical occupa-
tional segregation. It brings an explanation to a "glass ceiling" impeding womens (resp.
28Which allows that all workers be paid their marginal productivity.
29The competition exposure criterion (more likely discrimination occurence in less competitive markets)
is actually one when accounting for wage discrimination. When only occupational segregation is involved,
competition exposure is of no help.
30Arrow (1998) shows that, in the standard model, assumption of employee discriminatory taste may
lead to an explanation of segregation within industries but not segregation by occupation.
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blacks) occupational advancement by assuming that men (resp. whites) do not accept to
receive orders from women (resp. blacks31).
Although statistical discrimination may explain that diﬀerent agents with similar pro-
ductive traits do not have the same chance of obtaining a job, it is not clear how it could
explain the occupational distribution of socio-demographic groups. It may be argued
that the skills required by some industries are more easily observed than those required
by others but it leaves us with little indication as to where one should expect hiring dis-
crimination to occur as a consequence of statistical discrimination. Vertical occupational
segregation could result from the fact that, for instance, managerial or administrative
skills are less easy to observe than more technical ones. This would be another channel
to explain the "glass ceiling" phenomenon.
But vertical occupational segregation does not necessarily involve hierarchical aspects
as Neumark (1996) shows. Besides, what do previous micro empirical studies tell us about
available explanations? Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) use their Þndings to test the
plausibility of alternative explanations (mostly, taste-based and statistical discrimination
theories). Some of their results raise doubts about customer and co-worker discrimina-
tion: they do not Þnd any hardening of discrimination among jobs that explicitly require
"communication skills" and those for which one expects either customer or co-worker
contacts to be higher. As regards statistical discrimination, authors suggest that, if em-
ployers tend to use race to proxy for unobservable skills, resumés enhancement should
reduce discrimination: they obtain a lower return to credentials for African Americans!32
The main explanation to Neumark (1996) Þndings is customer discrimination33: high-
price restaurant managers discriminate against women because clientele prefers waiters
31Cf Sundstroms (1994) conclusions mentioned above.
32This argument seems invalidating only as regards models assuming that the precision of human capital
signals vary whether they are sent by black or white applicants and that employers are risk adverse. But we
saw that evidence exist of higher average human capital among whites than among blacks. Furthermore,
Bertrand and Mullainathans (2003) result can be regarded as an interesting Þnding as far as self-fulÞlling
prophecy mechanisms are considered. Indeed, it suggests that the return to human capital is actually
lower for members of the minority group: they have a lower incentive to invest in human capital which
is consistent with the pre-market disparities story displayed above.
33Employment discrimination is ruled out because the proportion males among the waitstaﬀ is not
positively related to whether hiring decision are made by male owners and managers.
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to waitresses.34 However, it remains unclear why high-price restaurants customers should
be more prejudiced against women than low-price restaurants customers.
Previous explanations can predict horizontal occupational segregation.35 But they do
not say where it is the most likely to occur. Regarding vertical occupational segregation,
few insights are available that do not invoke hierarchical aspects. Even though some
theories provide valuable insights,36 we saw that vertical occupational segregation could
arise without involving hierarchical aspects.
2.2.2 Explanations that do not involve hiring discrimination
One can explain occupational segregation without mobilizing hiring discrimination.
Human capital. A Þrst possibility is that group diﬀerences in pre-labor market human
capital investment and in non-labor market activities may lead to diﬀerences in compar-
ative advantages across occupations. This can both account for horizontal and vertical
occupational segregation. As for vertical occupational segregation, human capital theories
seem particularly well suited to enlighten diﬀerences between blacks and whites, a bit less
as regards gender diﬀerences. This trail brings us back to what is argued above as for
earnings gaps, and seems relevant mostly to the analysis of black workers exclusion from
high status occupations. Yet, the nature of the gender and racial diﬀering comparative
advantage across occupations remains unspeciÞed.
Preferences. Altonji and Blank (1999, p.3176) mention another possible explanation:
that members of diﬀerent groups select into diﬀerent occupations, notably because social
norms regarding appropriate occupations may diﬀer between groups. What is more,
preferences for the characteristics of occupations may diﬀer between groups, particularly
men and women. This is consistent with facts: diﬀerences in preferences for certain types
of jobs account for a substantial portion of the earnings gap.37 But, again, the very nature
34Consistent - according to Neumark (1996) - with customer discrimination is the evidence that the
proportion male among the waitstaﬀ is signiÞcantly positively related to the proportion male among the
clientele.
35Although their empirical relevance remains questionable.
36We will come again on the "glass ceiling" argument below.
37See Gunderson (1989, p. 52).
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of these diﬀering preferences are not speciÞed.
What is behind? As for gender diﬀerences, Corcoran and Courant (1985) provide
some assumptions about how sex role socialization might aﬀect labor market outcomes.
They mention four ways through which socialization might aﬀect occupational behavior.
Among them two human capital arguments: that socialization may lead women to be
more fearful or more anxious, or less conÞdent than men are; that sex role socialization
may directly aﬀect workers skills and personality traits. But they also mention two
"taste" explanations: that childen may internalize traditional notions of sex roles, accept
these cultural sex stereotypes as fact, and eventually choose occupations that conform
to these stereotypes; that sex role socialization may aﬀect the values men an women
attach to diﬀerent activities so that workers of both sexes tend to value "sex appropriate"
activities. In fact, comparable arguments could be invoked as regards racial diﬀerences
as suggested in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
In line with these latter suggestions, McCrate (1988) focuses on the central role of
endogenous preferences in the understanding of gender diﬀerence. Our approach follows
a similar inspiration.
3 A motivation-based theory of hiring discrimination
which generates statistical earnings disparities
Facing previous evidence on disparities in the labor market and available explanatory
hypotheses, we develop in the sequel some arguments suggested by our approach which
we believe are both consistent with evidence and enlightening as regards labor market
outcomes.
3.1 A model of hiring discrimination
Let us begin with a summary of our argument regarding hiring discrimination. In our
analysis, agents decide whether achieving self-esteem through their job or through other
activities outside their working life. In the former case, they develop an intrinsic mo-
tivation to eﬀort at work. Certain individual characteristics curb this choice since the
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comfortable holding of the workplace identity requires to Þt in some ideal attributes. Ac-
cording to Þeld studies we displayed in Baguelin (2004), ideal attributes when one holds
the workplace identity are to be a white middle age male with a considered-as-proper
initial education, devoided of strong commitments outside ones working life. As a conse-
quence, all other things equal, agents exhibiting characteristics which match the previous
portrait should choose the workplace identity (and hence, develop intrinsic motivation to
eﬀort) for lower wage amounts than others. If the description of the oﬀered job makes it
proÞtable for the employer to arouse the workplace identity - that is, when the propensity
of the employee to hold the workplace identity makes a diﬀerence, employers will hire the
former Þrst (at the expense of the latter) which leads to employment discrimination.38
Jobs description makes those jobs either strongly fulÞlling (SF ), weakly fulÞlling (WF )
or unfulÞlling (UF ) to an individual of a given socio-demographic group. The conclusion
of Baguelin (2004) are summarized in the following picture.
SF
Relative appeal of 
the out-of-the-
workplace identity
For the members of 
the majority group




Set of jobs for which 
discrimination occurs
How well does our explanation account for evidence about socio-demographic dispar-
ities in the labor market?
3.2 The interpretation of micro evidence
Let us use our model to interpret micro evidence.
38Purists would say that we are not dealing with discrimination: indeed, there exists objective dif-
ferences as regards individuals productive characteristics, there ability to develop intrinsic motivations.
But from an econometricians point of view, motivation is not something observable: our model is then
actually grounded on unobservable diﬀerences between socio-demographic groups.
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3.2.1 Interpreting the results of audit studies
From the perspective of our model, the basic interpretation of Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003)s Þndings would be the following: being black moves an individuals characteristics
aside from the ideal attributes associated to the workplace identity. Assuming a partic-
ular concentration of jobs whose description makes them at most (resp. at least) weakly
fulÞlling to a black (resp. to a white), whites are expected to develop a stronger intrinsic
motivation so that it is rational from employers to favor their applications. Moreover,
extrapolating our model, the following explanation to the lower return to credentials for
blacks (see above) can be suggested. Bertrand and Mullainathan mention their concern
that resumés enhancement could have a reverse eﬀect since it could lead the job applicant
to be perceived as over-qualiÞed.39 Employers usually have a mixed look at overqualiÞ-
cation: on the one hand, it signals higher "material" ability, on the other hand, hiring
over-qualiÞed individuals involves a risk of low motivation at work (and, presumably, of
high turnover propensity). Hence, this balance is more likely to be disrupted with blacks,
whose intrinsic motivation in weakly fulÞlling jobs is presumed to be lower. Our approach
also raises a question which is not adressed by Bertrand and Mullainathan as regards po-
tential weaknesses of their experiment. What if black-sounding names are interpreted
by employers as reßecting community attachment (within our models framework, a pre-
sumption that blacks outside option as regards self-esteem is higher than whites): in
our identity perspective, this would increase reservation utility, and justify the fact that
whites are favored.40
Our interpretation of Neumarks conclusions would involve that catering occupations
do not comprehend the same job description whether one considers low-price restaurants
or high-price ones. Working as a waitperson in the latter brings wider scope but is likely
to be more demanding than in low-price restaurants to the extent that the quality of the
meal service is then crucial (higher price often responds to higher demands as for service
quality): catering jobs in luxury restaurants are presumed to be at least weakly fulÞlling
to a man but at most weakly fulÞlling to a woman. The stronger propensity of men to
39See the sections devoted to the building of a bank of resumés or the one adressing the potential
counfounds.
40The role of attachement to ethnic origins in the determining of performance in the labor market is
already emphasized by Akerlof & Kranton (2000, p.738).
19
develop intrinsic motivation as waiters in establishments where service is more formal
encourages managers to give them an advantage over women.
A further point deserves attention. Neumark evokes a Newsweek article discussing
his study, in which one restaurant owner explained the lack of waitresses in his upscale
restaurant as "a question of us seeing an endless number of male applicants and few
female applicants" (Newsweek April 10, 1995). If true, this could be consistent with
our explanation. Indeed, for the oﬀered contract (which targets men) women are not
willing to exert the required level of eﬀort: they do not apply because the contract is not
satisfying to them. A comparable fact is observed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).
They Þnd that federal contractors, who are thought to be more severly constrained by
aﬃrmative action laws,41 do not discriminate less than other Þrms; neither do larger
employers who explicitly state that they are an "Equal Opportunity Employer" in their
ads. This suggests that, statistically, there is few malevolent recruiters i.e. practices do
not look arbitrary: no matter how Þrms care about equity, when oﬀered jobs are at least
weakly fulÞlling to white applicants, their ability to develop an intrinsic motivation makes
their hiring economically justiÞed.
3.2.2 Further micro interpretations
Childless women are proved to work in higher-pay occupations than mothers of the same
age.42 Assume that some well paid jobs which are weakly fulÞlling to women remain to
be Þlled but that there is a shortage of men exhibiting the ideal attributes associated to
the workplace identity. Employers start looking at other applications. Having children
(particularly preschoolers) feeds the presumption of high self-esteem achievement oppor-
tunities outside the workplace that is of high reservation utility. Inducing eﬀort from a
childless woman is then presumed to be cheaper so that they are favored. This would not
have been the case for a job that would have been unfulÞlling or strongly fulÞlling to both
mothers and childless women.
Let us turn to the interpretation of available statistical evidence.
41Leonards [1990] (see Holzer [1998]) indicates that federal contractors are indeed more likely to hire
blacks than non-contractors due to federal aﬃrmative action regulations.
42OECD Employment outlook (2002, p.108).
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3.3 Accounting for statistical realities
We cannot talk of predictions as regards the aggregate implications we derive from our
model: the assumptions we made about the structure of the labor market are far too
particular. It prevents us from giving a precise account of how a Þnite number of workers
from the minority or majority socio-demographic groups should be distributed among
jobs under competitive pressures. However, by isolating the role of an identity trade-oﬀ,
we believe that our model brings interesting explanatory arguments as regards statistical
facts.
3.3.1 Socio-demographic gaps in average earnings
From the building of the set of jobs for which discrimination occurs within the space of
jobs, described by a pair (scope, degree of demand), we give some potential consequences of
the particular occupational segregation we obtained, in terms of unequal earnings between
socio-demographic groups. The gap in average earnings (favorable to agents who Þt in)
may be a consequence of the fact that the potential share of jobs for which discrimination
occurs is increasing in expected pay: hiring discrimination is more likely in the class of
well-paid jobs than in the class of poorly paid ones. Why is it so? Because pay is increasing
in the degree of demand, and the more demanding a job, the stronger the incentives for
the employers to arouse an intrinsic motivation (i.e. the workplace identity): it is precisely
on that ground that discrimination takes place in our analysis. All things considered, our
explanation of earnings disparities (as a macro statistical fact) is very simple: female and
black individuals earn less than white males because they are relatively more concentrated
in less demanding occupations. Evidence regarding this presumed trend are analyzed in
what follows.
Let us look at the question of gender earnings gap in more detail using further existing
evidence.
3.3.2 Gender composition of occupations and earnings
Two widely documented facts are conÞrmed by Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) as regards
the relation between the share of women within an occupation and earnings: (1) both
women and men earn less as the proportion of female workers in their occupation increases;
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(2) the negative impact of the female proportion in an occupation on wages is stronger
for men than for women.
We believe our model provides interesting suggestions as regards the understanding of
these facts. Yet, it requires to renounce to interprete them as evidence that the female
proportion in an occupation is a determinant of the average wage in this occupation. Let
us display the interpretation our perspective would support. Consider the fact (1). The
average wage in a given occupation decreases with the degree of demand. The lower this
degree, the less likely the employer will arouse the workplace identity. If she does not,
that is, if the job under consideration is unfulÞlling to a man, no discrimination occurs.
Hence, the female proportion in such an occupation is likely to be high (since most male
workers should be concentrated in discriminating jobs) although there could also be some
men. Since there is no pure pay discrimination, both men and women receive low wages,
which is consistent with the fact (1). Let us turn to the fact (2). Assume further that the
out-of-the-workplace self-esteem of men is lower than that of women (potentially because
they have fewer opportunities to develop self-esteem at home, for instance through family
activities). Then, the reservation utility is lower for men than for women and men are
paid less.43
3.3.3 Gaps in average earnings due to motivation-based occupational segre-
gation: how lasting are they?
To be long lasting, discrimination should increase proÞts or non-discrimination should be
costly. This is precisely the case in our model. We obtain an unambiguous increase in
proÞts associated to discrimination when it takes place.44 Moreover, our argument for this
result seems more cross-occupational than existing alternatives allowing higher proÞt to
discriminating employers,45 which is consistent with Mullainathan and Bertrand (2003)s
43Indeed, the participation constraint is then binding for both men and women but mens reservation
utility is assumed lower.
44That is, for jobs which are at most weakly fulÞlling to members of the minority group but at least
weakly fulÞlling to members of the majority group.
45We saw, for instance, that the customers taste for discrimination hypothesis does obviously not
work well in the absence of face-to-face contacts between employees and customers possessing the "taste
for discrimination". For other theories of discrimination resisting to competitive pressure, see Darity &
Mason (1998).
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Þndings showing that the amount of discrimination is uniform across occupations and
industries. What matters from our motivation-based perspective is the job description
(whether or not this description feeds an incentive for the employer to arouse the workplace
identity). Jobs for which discrimination occurs are likely to be uniformly distributed across
industries and we see no reason supporting the assumption that they should disappear in
the long run.
3.3.4 The relation between occupational exclusion and fulfilment in the work-
place
In the absence of any shortage of workers from the majority group, our model suggests
that jobs which are at most (resp. at least) weakly fulÞlling to members of the minority
group (resp. of the majority group) should be held by members of the majority group (in
any case, those workers should be given the priority).
As a consequence and more concretely, women should be distributed either in jobs
which are strongly fulÞlling or unfulÞlling to them. This suggests a non-monotonic proÞle
as one looks at a possible relation between occupational exclusion and fulÞlment in the
workplace. It is interesting to look at the table illustrating occupational segregation
with such an idea in mind. The relative higher concentration of white women both in
the Professional job category (presumed to comprehend more fulÞlling jobs) and in the
Service job category (presumed to comprehend more unfulÞlling jobs) could be viewed as
a potential manifestation of the non-monotonic proÞle our model displays. Things look
less convincing as for black workers, who primary concentrate in blue-collar jobs.
4 Discussion
So far, we use our model to interprete micro evidence. We now check our model ade-
quacy to statistical Þndings, wondering whether actual socio-demographic occupational
distributions are consistent with what our story suggests.
23
4.1 Further evidence consistent with our modeling: jobs de-
scription, and the distribution of socio-demographic groups
It is noteworthy that in our model, the occuring of discrimination is not independent from
technological or organizational aspects (there is no arbitrary behavior from employers):
the description of jobs under consideration determines how likely hiring discrimination is
and, consequently, occupational segregation should reßect diﬀerences in jobs description.
Our explanation to racial/gender wage disparities in the labor market lies on the idea
that white males are relatively more represented in more demanding jobs. As for the
role of scope, it is argued that little discrimination should occur in unfulÞlling jobs (low
scope). Do facts tell us anything about these hypotheses?
4.1.1 Socio-demographic distribution among jobs of varying scope
Lucas (1974) analyses the distribution of job characteristics by race and by gender. Among
job characteristics, there are two dummy variables that we believe could be related to
scope: repetitive and specific instruction. The Þrst variable takes value 1 if the job
under consideration involves repetitive or short cycle operations carried out according
to set procedures or sequences. We believe repetitiveness can be adversely related to
scope. Indeed, the more repetitive his task, the more precise the expectation as about
its outcomes, the lower the worker s scope. Specific instruction takes value 1 if the
incumbent is asked to do things only under speciÞc instruction, allowing little or no room
for independent action or judgement in working out problems. Lucas Þnds that: blacks
do perform more repetitive jobs on average than do whites; that they are more subject
to speciÞc instruction than white workers. Besides, a greater proportion of blacks than of
whites holds jobs at the bottom of the hierarchy, involving only taking instructions.
Although, we view as erroneous the interpretation of the ranking of a job within a
hierarchy as a measure of the scope it oﬀers to its incumbent, it looks reasonable to deem
that jobs at the bottom of the hierarchy are unlikely to be of wide scope. Since, arousing
intrinsic motivation to eﬀort for such jobs would be too costly (they are bound to be
unfulÞlling), no discrimination should occur: black workers aiming for these jobs obtain
them without diﬃculties. As regards gender diﬀerences, Lucas Þnds that women are more
subject to speciÞc instructions than men but not that their job is more repetitive.
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Holzer (1998) reports Þndings which we view as indirect evidence of the role of scope
in discrimination occurence. He shows that small establishments hire less blacks than
large ones. An interesting point is that this arises although large establishments employ
more highly skilled workers: indeed, it makes human capital arguments irrelevant. Holzer
shows that commonly called upon explanations do little to help account for the observed
diﬀerences in racial hiring outcomes across establishment size categories. Our explanation
for such a Þnding would be the following. Assume that mean scope is wider among jobs
in small establishments than among those in large ones (labor division is expected to
be stronger in the latter). Then, jobs are more likely to be at least weakly fulÞlling
to white workers in small establishments which induce employers to try arousing the
workplace identity: this makes discrimination against blacks more likely. Furthermore,
the assumption that scope could be a substitute to earnings is consistent with the fact
that small establishments pay their employees lower wages than large ones.
4.1.2 Socio-demographic distribution among jobs of varying degree of de-
mand
The more demanding a job, the stronger the incentive for the employers to try arousing
intrinsic motivations and thus the more likely hiring discrimination. Hence, white male
workers should be relatively more concentrated in demanding jobs than female or black
workers. There is no consensual measurement of degree of demand, and one could be
doubtful as regards the interest of an analysis invoking such a variable. As the desutility
associated with a job is considered, proxies could be pure physical strenuousness, tasks
complexity, training requirements, time ßexibility requirements, exposure to stress... etc.,
and the adequacy of our perspective to explain the available evidence obviously diﬀers
according to the proxy one favors. Let us, nevertheless, mention some empirical results
that we view as related to our problem.
Lucas (1974) Þnds that: black males average most jobs involving diﬃcult working con-
ditions,46 and white females much of the lowest frequencies of diﬃcult working conditions;
blacks, both male and female, clearly average many more jobs requiring physical exer-
cice.47 Furthermore, Lucas observes that being black and being female both act against
46Working conditions are deÞned with regards to: heat, wet, noise, hazards, fumes.
47These results obviously capture diﬀerences in human capital: the less human capital the more likely
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a worker in the probabilities of having jobs requiring lengthier specific vocational prepa-
ration48: almost half of the black women are in jobs which require less than 30 days of
experience to acquire the skills necessary to perform the task; by contrast, 40% of white
men are in jobs requiring more than two years of speciÞc vocational preparation.49 As
regards racial diﬀerences in the distribution of job characteristics, previous Þndings carry
ambiguities: if the degree of demand is reduced to its physical aspects, black employees
seem to be in more demanding jobs than their white counterpart and the latter suggestion
from our model looks invalidated. But non-physical aspects are bound to be at least as
important and previous Þndings suggest that white workers carry out more complex and
exacting tasks. Furthermore, the incumbency of high-graded jobs suppose more respon-
sabilities which involves stress. All that makes the invalidation of is suggested by our
model as regards racial occupational disparities not so deÞnitive. Besides, when consid-
ering the test of our results for gender disparities, there is evidence supporting our view
much more boldly.
Indeed, focusing on gender diﬀerences, Gupta (1993) obtains Þndings that are con-
sistent with those of Lucas (1974). A job attribute index is constructed by Gupta using
a data set measuring variables such as strength requirements, degree of stress, degree of
repetition in work... etc. The higher this index the less "demanding" (in our words) the
corresponding job. Gupta Þnds that: females have signiÞcantly greater values for job
attribute index; the most male-dominated occupation (crafts/labor) has the lowest value
of the attribute index; workers in the "female occupation"50 have the highest value for
the index. Both results are consistent with our model.
The OECD employment outlook for 2002 displays Þndings (mainly involving white col-
lar jobs) suggesting that occupational segregation by gender results in an under-utilisation
of womens cognitive skills.51 Authors look at the job content for women compared to that
the exposure to diﬃcult working conditions and repetitive tasks. However, we think they also reßect
diﬀerent choice as regards self-esteem achievement strategies.
48The speciÞc vocational preparation indicates the time necessary to learn the techniques, acquire the
information, and develop the facility needed for average performance.
49Can we not think the access to SVP could be discriminatory? We are conÞdent that the "speciÞc to
a job" s nature of SVP makes it unlikely that discrimination be at stake in SVP engagement.
50Jobs which are at least 60% female.
51See OECD employment outlook (2002, pp. 93, 94).
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for men with respect to the extent of utilisation of their skills on the job and of individual
perceptions about the complexity of their work tasks. This leads to the following Þndings:
in spite of educational attainment levels that are similar for women and men (or even in
favor of women), women engage in writing and reading at work less frequently and/or
with less variety than men in all the countries examined; fewer women than men declare
that they are carrying out complex tasks in their jobs; more women than men, however,
feel that the demands imposed on them by their jobs are too low relative to their skills
and, conversely, fewer women than men think they are too high; the skill requirements of
many mens jobs are higher than womens.
Let us come again on the relationship between our approach and the main alternative
theories.
4.2 Some added value to other micro theories?
4.2.1 Taste-based theories of discrimination
Perhaps, one of the most convincing contribution of taste-based theories of discrimination
is the explanation it provides to the "glass ceiling" phenomenon: women (or blacks) fail
to progress in hierarchy because white men hardly accept to be supervised by them.
Nevertheless, high-graded jobs do not necessary involve personnel management so that,
this mechanism could come onto horizontal segregation leaving socio-demographic gaps
unexplained.52 At this stage, let us mention a further Þnding of the OECD emloyment
outlook (2002). Women are less prone than men to feel that they have the skills or
qualiÞcations to do a more demanding job than the one they occupy.53 Although we
consider it separately, the importance of this latter evidence is better understood when
connected to latter mentioned OECD Þndings: it seems that women are less likely than
men to wish to occupy high demanding jobs. From the perspective of our model this can
be interpreted as evidence that women are more numerous to hold the out-the-workplace
identity than men. Hence, vertical gender segregation may result less from rebellious
52As regards how labour mobility can allow overcoming the consequences of prejudiced economic agents
behavior, see Cain (1986).
53This last subjective indicator may reßect both ones perceptions about the adequacy of ones skills
and qualiÞcations for the jobs demands as well as ones aspirations for a more demanding job.
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co-workers54 than from the preferences of women. In any case, our view suggests another
way to look at the glass ceiling phenomenon.
4.2.2 Human capital theories, and motivation-based theory of discrimination
Gender disparities. Since the ability to develop motivation to eﬀort might be com-
prehended as a form of human capital, one could see our story as closely related to that of
Becker (1985) which mobilizes human capital theory.55 However, our argument does not
deal with sexual division of labor but with self-esteem achievement strategies. An empiri-
cal analysis exists that both diﬀerentiates our explanation from that of Becker (1985) and
emphasizes its relevance as regards facts. Lobel and St. Clair (1992) studies the eﬀects
of family responsabilities, gender, and career identity salience on performance outcomes.
When controlling identity salience (career- or family-oriented), neither extensive family
responsabilities nor female gender adversely aﬀects merit increase. This result limits the
empirical worth of Beckers (1985) prediction as regards the consequences of having family
responsabilities.56 By contrast, identity salience is proved to positively aﬀect both merit
increase and work eﬀort.57
Racial disparities: the issue of unobserved human capital. Holzer and Ihlanfeldt
(1998) note that a much smaller part of the racial diﬀerences in employment rates than
wage rates is eliminated by the AFQT.58 This suggests that Neal and Johnsons (1996)
insights be not so comprehensive as regards racial disparities in the labor market. In
more precise terms, this feeds the presumption that stories of purely cognitive pre-market
diﬀerences in human capital, while bound to explain racial earnings gap could leave the
54Besides, personel management could be understood as an aspect of the degree of demand attached
to a job.
55The argument of Becker [1985] is the following. Because housework an childcare are more eﬀort-
intensive than leisure activities, individuals with household responsabilities will economize on the eﬀort
expended at work by seeking relatively undemanding jobs. Prediction would be that individuals family
responsabilies should have a direct, negative eﬀect on work eﬀort. This to justify that women be less
likely to be hired than men.
56But also the gender discrimination storys prediction.
57Age, education, tenure, position, salary, number of children, preschool child and gender being con-
troled.
58A presumed mesure of pre-market skills.
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question of hiring performance diﬀerentials unanswered. Our model explicitly treats the
problem of employment access by giving an account of why hiring discrimination could
occur. To this extent, it can be viewed as complementing human capital theory by
stressing on non-cognitive aspects of human capital: the ability to develop motivation at
work. Besides, even as one considers the racial earnings gap, there are empirical Þnding
supporting the idea that non-cognitive aptitudes are relevant explicatives of the level of
wages.59 This is emphasized by Bowles, Gintis, and Osborn (2001) through their notion
of incentive enhancing preferences.
We believe it worthy to stress the fact that human capital understanding of disparities
in the labor market (to which our approach could be aﬃliated) does not rule out the issue
of discrimination: it states that discrimination takes place outside the labor market, not
that it does not exist.
4.2.3 Crowding hypothesis, statistical discrimination, and a motivation-based
theory
Our analysis could bring compensation for some weaknesses existing models display.
Hiring discrimination: the statistical argument. We believe that the identity
trade-oﬀ we highlight is particularly well suited to the statistical discrimination mech-
anism. Indeed, some characteristics favoring the holding of the workplace identity may
remain unobserved by the employer: thus, the statistical discrimination mechanism can
add up to the self-esteem achievement trade-oﬀ we introduce. In addition, the statistical
discrimination argument work better when actual diﬀerences exist between workers.60
Occupational segregation and the gender gap: the crowding hypothesis. Be-
cause it involves competitive forces, we did not mention so far a third cause directly
connected to occupational segregation and often invoked in the explanation of the gender
gap in pay: the "Crowding hypothesis".61 The idea is that because women are very much
crowded into a relative few occupations, market functioning leads to a lower equilibrium
59See Bowles, Gintis, and Osborn (2001).
60As it was argued in the Þrst section, such diﬀerences are found to be at most weakly signiÞcant.
61See Bergman (1971).
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wage for female labor services. But this is clearly only half an explanation since the
question of why female crowding comes to be true remains unanswered. Johnson and
Staﬀord (1997) provides a model analyzing how institutional constraints, social norms,
or employer discrimination might "crowd" a group into particular occupations. But, as
Altonji and Blank (1999, p.3180) points it, a major weakness of this stream continues
to be a lack of formal models that analyze the mechanisms through which social norms
or institutional constraints arise and are sustained. For this very reason, we believe that
our model might constitute a useful complement to studies that support the crowding
hypothesis: because the workplace identity is, all other things equal, "less aﬀordable" to
women than to men, they tend to crowd in jobs that are either unfulÞlling or strongly
fulÞlling to them.
In the discussion above, we suggest that the various manifestations of socio-demographic
disparities in the labor market should be studied together, and that analyses connecting
these manifestations are valuable. After presenting elements curbing the explanatory ap-
propriatedness of theories of direct pay discrimination, we tried to show the expected
beneÞts of an analysis accounting for disparities in the distribution of diﬀerent socio-
demographic groups between available jobs (and particularly with respect to vertical
occupational segregation). This led us to present some aspects of an approach based
on socio-demographic diﬀerences as regards optimal strategy of self-esteem achievement.
Indeed, although motivational aspects are sometimes invoked in the litterature to explain
the gaps in earnings between socio-demographic groups, few theoretical studies are de-
voted to this argument. Our analysis suggests that, for some jobs whose description is
speciÞed, black or female workers could manifest lower motivation at work than white
men as a consequence of diverging strategies of identity building.
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